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SOME DISPUTED POINTS WITH REGARD TO 
THE EVENTS OF THE GREAT WAR OF 1914-18. 
By MAJOR T. E. COMPTON. 
I.--?‘HE FRESCH PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 
II.-THE ABANDONMENT OF THE BRIEY IROSFIELUS. 
111 .-SALOXICA. 
I\..-SUVLz\ BAY. 
\’.-I<UT. 
v~.--Vo;u KLUCK’S CHASGE OF DIRECTIOX BEFORE THE BATTLE OF 
THE MARNE. 
THE FRENCH PLAN OF CAMPAIGN IN 1914. 
I?’ is generally a rather distressing exercise for military men who 
have spent perhaps forty years or more of their lives in the study 
and practice of their profession, to have to read an account of military 
operations by a civilian. Yet more often than not it is the only 
source of information available, and so long as the writer refrains 
from indulging in dogmatic appreciations and sweeping criticisms, 
especially adverse criticism of distinguished living generals, and 
contents himself with recording the facts and describing the nature 
of the theatre, his work may be of much interest, and even of the 
very greatest value. 
There are several good French civilian writers on military opera- 
tions. 11. Bidou, in the ]ourtial des Dkbats, and 31. Joseph Reinach 
(Polybe), in the Figaro, both did valuable work during the war. 
Nevertheless, when an interim writer-evidently a soldier-took 
R l .  Bidou’s place for a week a change for the better (from a purely 
professional point of view, of course) was at once noticeable. But 
whether the soldier could have gone on writing, supposing him to 
have had the time, day after day, with equal excellence as 31. Bidou 
did, is another matter. 31. Gabriel Hanotaus, the Acadeniician and 
former minister, is another brilliant writer on military operations, 
whose style is most .agreeable, even when his conclusions are open to 
objection.1 His “ Histoire de la Gzie~re de 1914,’’ and his articles in 
the Revue des Deiix Mondes in 1916, threw much light on the French 
plan of campaign, until then regarded, generally, as a complete enigma. 
In 1918 another prominent man, M. Fernand Eugeraud, Deputy 
for Calvados in the French Chamber, took up the matter in the 
Correspondant Magazine. As RI. Eugeraud is a member of the 
Catholic-Monarchist Right, and in consequence a political opponent 
1 hr. Hanotaux’s description of the Battle of the TrouCe de Charmes produced 
n spirited reply in La Revue by an officer who had been apparently on the Staff 
of the First Army, who directly traversed some of his conclusions. 
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DISPUTED POINTS 1 x 7 1 ~ ~  REGARD TO THE GREAT WAR 491 
of all the republican parties, he, no doubt unconsciously, at once 
introduced a marked controversial element into the discussion. In 
fact, these articles, now published, with others on the Dolitical prelude 
to the war, as a book at 1 j francs, constitute-although the author dis- 
claims it-a vigorous indictment of the French republican governments 
for abandoning the defences of the northern frontier, and of Marshal 
Joffre for both’the adoption of an offensive plan and for its execution. 
These articles appeared a t  a most unfortunate time for polemical 
writing on military matters; namely, in March, April, and hlay of 
rgrs, and since then it has been generally thought premature to raise 
a controversy of this sort before the principal actors have leisure to 
esplain the reasons for their dispositions and to reply-if they think 
it worth while-to criticism. 
Severtheless, the wisdom of the French plan of campaign, both in 
its nature and in its direction, is certainly open to argument, while 
its esecution was an undoubted failure. 
When all tlie facts are linown, however, the verdict of history is 
likely to be in favour of hIarshal Joffre, or will at least esonerate him 
from unwisdom and rashness in his plan of campaign for reasons 
indicated in the following brief appreciation. 
M. Eugeraud asserts, in very dogmatic fashion, that to avoid 
disaster at the outset, a rigorous defensive \\.as a strategical necessity, 
both on account of the configuration of the frontier and the state of 
preparedness of the German Armies. 
Although he writes after the event, we must do him the justice 
of accepting his statement that he has all along been an  advocate, 
together with tlie lamented Colonel Driant, another Catholic deputy 
and son-in-law of General Boulanger, of the preparation for defence 
of the northern frontier, and he quite rightly points out that i t  was 
the abandonment of the defences in 1900 that made tlie violation of 
Belgian neutrality a certainty. 
He  adopts 
as  his alternative defensive plan, General de Rivihre’s scheme of 1885, 
thirty years old, when the conditions of armament and, above all, of 
numbers of trained men available on mobilization, were very different 
from what they were in August, 1914. Secondly, he talies no account 
of the immense advantage to an army of the offensive spirit, apart 
altogether from the value of seizing the initiative, which an offensive 
plan of campaign implies. 
Moreover, in all the great wars of the previous sisty years, the 
offensive had triumphed both strategically and tactically. The Crimea, 
1859 in Italy, 1866 in Bohemia, 1870-71 in France, 1877 in European 
Turkey, and the Manchurian campaign of I p 1 - j ,  had all been con- 
ducted by the victor on an offensive plan, while tlie Battles of the 
Alma, Solferino, Koniggratz, all the battles of 1870, and all those 
of the Manchurian campaign, escept perhaps the Shaho, had been won 
by the army adopting a tactical offensive. 
There were good reasons, therefore, why the I;rench Staff should 
have turned away from de RiviCre’s defensive plan of 1885, and 
His thesis is, however, vitiated by two weaknesses. 
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492 DISPUTED POINTS WITH REGARD TO THE GREAT WAR 
reverted once more to the methods of the great Napoleon.’ It may 
even be said that they were justified by the event, despite the reverses 
on the frontier, and that it was the offensive spirit of the French, 
inculcated in time of peace, that enabled them to attack the astonished 
Germans again in grand style, within a fortnight of Charleroi and the 
.Ardennes, and win the Battle of the Marne; and for four years after- 
wards to attack again and again, until finally, with their Allies the 
British-equally partisans of the offensive-they swept a!l before them 
to the most complete and decisive victory won in Europe since IVaterloo. 
It may be reasonably doubted whether troops trained under de Rivicre’s 
scheme of, practically, passive defence, would have had the same spirit. 
Broadly stated, this plan, which has so much taken A l .  Eugeraud’s 
fancy, was, in addition to the fortifications of the eastern frontier, to 
fortify the space between the fortresses of Maubeuge and Lille, but 
utilizing the rivers to form a system of inundations, and generally 
to render this part of the northern frontier impregnable, with an 
entrenched camp at Lille capable of holding a large army to protect 
the left flank and operate as occasion offered; while the part left open 
east of blaubeuge was to be closed, in second line, by a fortified 
position on the hilly ground on the front Laon-La Fbre-Rheims, 
where the great battle was to be fought. The enemy repulsed, mas 
then to be driven back over the frontier by a counter-offensive. 
This plan would have certainly presented greater obstacles to the 
enemy’s advance in 1914 than was actually the case; but in view of 
the numbers and the matkriel that the Germans brought into the field 
compared with the French matdriel available, so far from possessing 
that absolute perfection that AI. Eugeraud mould apparently claim 
for it, it is at least conceivable that this plan would have ended by 
placing the Allies in a worse position than they were in after the 
Rattle of the Marne. Hindenburg’s astonishing successes in East 
Prussia would have given the enemy plenty of time to conduct his 
operations with deliberation, while the offensive spirit of both Allies 
and Belgians would have suffered. 
As to Marshal Joffre’s responsibility, the fortifications of the 
northern frontier had, as before mentioned, been abandoned years 
before he became Chief of the Staff, and an offensive plan was de  
7igueur. 
The situation presented to him in 19x4 was as follows:-The war 
was about to be carried on on two fronts. 
On the Eastern Front, Russia would be ready to invade East 
Prussia on August 20th with a force of about twelve army corps and 
two or three cavalry divisions. 
In  these circumstances it was calculated, according to hl.  Hano- 
taus, that the French would have a superiority of numbers, to begin 
with, on the Western Front. 
Until Germany showed her hand, the policy of the French Govern- 
ment was to respect most carefully the neutrality of Belgium. In 
1The only time that Napoleon was really on the defensive was at Leipsic, 
a battle fought against his wish. His plan would have been quite a different one; 
but indiscipline in. his Army forced him to retreat on Leipsic. 
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DISPUTED POINTS WITH REGARD TO THE GREAT WAR 493 
consequence the concentration of the French Armies, on mobilization, 
had to be on the eastern frontier. 
The possibility of the enemy’s violation of Belgian neutrality 
had, however, to be kept in view, and a plan prepared to meet this 
contingency. The French were to advance on August 20th and attack 
the Germans in Belgian Luxembourg (the Ardennes), while the strong 
French Fifth Army, of twelve divisions, in conjunction with the 
British Expeditionary Force, was to deal with the enemy on the left 
bank of the Meuse (in Belgium), pivoting the right flank on the 
fortress of Namur. 
The French Staff miscalculated the strength of the German forces 
opposed to them by about nine army corps, which fact, combined 
with the gain of time by the Germans in mobilization, which could 
not be helped, although it might have been foreseen, accounts for 
the failure of Marshal Joffre’s offenkive plan of campaign. Both on 
the Sambre and in the Ardennes the Germans were in superior force 
and in superior readiness. Having the diplomatic initiative and 
declaring war the; gained two or three days on the French in mobiliz- 
ing. As to their strength, they appear to have been quite unaware 
of the advanced state of the Russian preparations or for the invasion 
of East Prussia, and left only four corps of the active Army on the 
Eastern Front for the defence of that province. 
From a purely military point of view it would have been sound 
strategy on the part of the Germans to have allowed East Prussia 
to be temporarily overrun in order to bring superiority of strength 
against the French ; but its effect on public opinion in Germany obliged 
them in the actual event to send back two army corps and a cavalry 
division after the first battles in Belgium. Had the Great Genera1 
Staff credited the possibility of the dilatory Russians being ready in 
such force by August 20th, the distribution of their army corps on 
the two fronts would in all probability have been more as the French 
Staff reckoned. The Germans, also, had more reserve corps ready on 
mobilization than was espected. 
Space forbids any attempt 
to criticize its esecution in detail. It failed for two reasons : the 
enemy on his side was ready to advance to the attack before the 
Allied offensive could be developed, and secondly, instead of seven 
corps on each side of the Rleuse, as it mas thought would be the 
enemy’s strength, the enemy had on the right bank thirteen and on 
the left ten. 
After the foregoing lines had been written, a long and extremely 
interesting article by 11. Hanotaus, inspired by and partly in answer 
to hI. Eugeraud’s criticizms, appeared in the Revue des Deux Afondes.1 
&I. Hanotaus’s information-which, as that of a former minister and 
member of the Acade‘mie Frangaise (Marshal Joffre being now also a 
member), should be of the very best-entirely confirms what had here 
been set down with regard to the French plan of campaign. For 
many years before 1914, the offensive, in case of war with Germany, 
had been the settled policy of the French Governments, and the fact 
1March Isth, 19x9. 
The French plan was boldly conceived. 
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494 DISPUTED POINTS WITH REG.4RD TO THE GREAT W A R  
has been quite recently fully admitted in the Chamber of Deputies 
by a former W a r  Minister, hl. Etienne, in the course of the Briey 
debate. 
Marshal Joffre, therefore, did not originate the offensive policy, 
although in accepting the appointment of Chief of the Staff in peace, 
and ex-off& Commander-in-Chief in war, he, of course, assented to it. 
It is highly probable, also, that it was the same with the actual 
plan of campaign, which in its main lines would naturally have been 
worked out and settled by the General Staff at the time when the 
offensive policy was adopted, after which it would only have been 
necessary to keep it up to date. What determined the offensive policy, 
according to RI. Hanotaus, was a calculation by the General Staff 
that the French could mobilize and concentrate more quickly than the 
Germans. Doubtless their calculation was correct, but what they 
failed to allow for was what actually occurred. Germany, being 
certainly the aggressor, obtained a good start in her mobilization before 
the actual declaration of war, by confidential orders and by such 
devices as declaring the country in a state of danger of war. 
The failure in execution of the French plan was due in great 
measure to this cause, which perhaps should be put down as  a fault 
on the part of the French Staff. It n.as also due to a misappreciation 
on the part of the French Staff and French Commander-in-Chief as 
to what would be the enemy’s plan. 
The French plan was based on the assumption that the German 
violation of Belgian neutrality (which was expected) would take the 
form of an advance on the right bank of the Meuse through the 
Belgian Ardennes. The invasion and occupation of the whole of 
Belgium did not enter, apparently, into the French appreciation of 
the situation. 
AI. Hanotaux admits that the German advance in force on the 
left bank of the Meuse surprised the French Staff. 
The French intended to attack the Germans in the Belgian 
Ardennes with three armies. The appearance of the enemy in force 
on the left bank of the Meuse obliged the displacement and despatch 
to the Sambre of the strong Fifth Army. 
The central mass of manceuvre was thus suddenly reduced by 
one-third when about to advance across the frontier. It is easy to 
see, from the fact that the Fifth -Army did not receive orders to 
move till August 15th (date of German attack on Dinant), how the 
French Staff clung to the last moment to their original conception 
of what the enemy’s plan would be. 
THE BRIEY, IROSFIELD. 
The Briey is a question that has been greatly debated both in 
the Press and in Parliament, and while the reasons for the abandon- 
ment of this Lorraine ironfield at the beginning of the war to peaceful 
exploitation by the enemy have been thrashed out, its esact value is 
still disputed. According to hi. Rieerheim, the syndicalist leader of 
the metal workers and one of the foremost men of the French Labour 
movement, who inspired some articles on the Briey ironfields in the 
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DISPUTED POISTS WITH REGARD TO THE GREAT WAR 495 
Temps, the Germans depended for the manufacture of their war material 
mainly on Swedish ironfields, and only a minimum proportion of their 
total requirements came from Briey. 
This is not, however, what the Germans say themselves; but 
AI. Aleerheim’s object, so he says, in inspiring these articles was to 
prevent the enormous losses which an attempt to capture Briey would 
have involved, which would have been more than Briey was worth. 
The French Staff, however, never had any intention of attacking 
the fields, for reasons that will be given later. 
Both in 1916 and 1917, the Committee of the .Association of all 
the great iron and steel manufacturers of the German Empire addressed 
a memorandum to the Chancellor, stating in 1916 that “ the Lorraine 
ironfields cover from 60 to 80 per cent. of the fabrication of iron 
and steel, and if the production ‘from these mines is seriously checked 
the war will be lost.” 
In 1917 the ~lIenroire fised the peace-time production at 60 to 68 
per cent. of the German requirements. It was the deputy already 
mentioned in connection with his criticizms of the French plan of 
campaign, A1. Fernand Eugeraud, who introduced the subject in the 
Chamber of Deputies on January 31st of this year, by vigorously 
attacking the French Staff and the French Government of August, 
1914, of which M .  Viviani was the chief, for not defending the Bassin 
d e  Briey.  
31. Eugeraud’s quotations from German official documents seem 
to settle affirmatively that part of the question in dispute as to whether 
the possession of BrieJ- was, or was not, essential to the continuance 
of the war by Germany. But as regards its non-defence and freedom 
from attack either from the land or from the air for the first half 
of the war, the French Staff would appear to have a sufficient answer. 
The Briey iron mines mere partly in French and partly in German 
territory. How, therefore, with the range of modern guns, requiring 
the fortifications or fieldworks to be several miles in advance of the 
zone to be protected, was it possible to arrange for the defence of 
Briey ? 
Again, with regard to absence of attack from the air, R I .  Albert 
Thomas, Minister of Alunitions, wanted soda from a neighbouring 
district for the manufacture of esplosives. Freedom from aerial attack 
for these French works he regarded as vital, for many months, and 
it mas at his desire and on his repeated representations that Briey was 
left in peace for fear of reprisals. An attack in this direction from 
Verdun was scarcely practicable, and would have been very costly. 
AI. Viviani escels as an  orator, and on January 31st he was able 
to bring off a big success in this line by representing in glowing 
language the moral effect produced throughout the world, or great 
political advantage for France, by his order, on war being declared, 
to withdraw the French troops eight to ten kilometres from the frontier, 
manifesting in this way the nation’s desire for peace and absence of 
all aggressive intention. He was also able to show that this order 
had nothing whatever to do with the abandonment of Briey, already 
decided on by the French Staff. 
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496 DISPUTED POINTS WITH REGARD T O  THE GREAT W.4R 
Doubtless, had it been possible to foresee the length of the war 
and the increased importance of heavy artillery, the \vorlis would 
have been destroyed and the mines damaged before abandonment; 
but at the time this valuable French property had to be left intact. 
SALONICA. 
From an Entente point of view, there is now no dispute about 
the wisdom or unwisdom of the Salonica Expedition. Events have 
proved it to have been right in a military sense as it was espedient 
for political reasons, although eminent critics-not all of whom hailed 
from Berlin-were fond of describing it, up to a year ago, as “ Ger- 
many’s best camp of concentration.” It was justified at the time, 
on military grounds, owing to the great superiority of force in reserve 
on the Entente side that it then seemed certain would be eventually 
trained and made available in Russia and in Great Britain. The 
unexpected Russian defection jeopardized its success for the moment, 
but in the end it was not only successful on its own ground, but 
proved a valuable aid to final victory in the principal theatre. 
The Salonica Expedition was conducted on right lines. It is a 
good esample of a secondary effort, that could not well be neglected, 
carried out as  Clausewitz said it should be invariably conducted. 
The main force of the Allies in the principal theatre was drawn on 
as little as possible. To begin with, more than half the expedition 
came from the Dardanelles, and towards the end the Serbs and Greeks 
furnished the largest contingents, while the Italians occupied Albania. 
To 31. Venizelos must be given most of the credit for the sound 
policy as for the brilliant success of the Salonica Espedition. His 
indomitable courage and far-seeing statesmanship triumphed over what 
a t  one time seemed almost unsuperable obstacles, so that in the end 
ten Greek divisions, well trained and well found, gave to General 
Franchet d’Esperey that superiority of numbers for which he had been 
waiting in order to assume the offensive, without drawing a man from 
the main theatre of operations in France. 
A great and far-reaching victory settled once and for all, from 
an Entente point of view, any question of dispute about the wisdom 
of the Salonica Expedition. 
There is, however, a disputed point on the German side with 
regard to this subsidiary campaign. 
General von Winterfeld, who was on the Armistice Commission 
of Spa, and \vho before the war was‘3lilitary Attach6 at Paris, stated 
to French officers that one of the faults that lost Germany the war 
was not following up the occupation of Serbia,. about Christmas, 1915, 
by a concentrated attack in force on the Salonica Expedition in Greek 
territory. 
This is likely to remain a disputed point, for some time to come 
a t  least. The Germans are too much occupied at present with internal 
troubles to bother about academic uestions of this kind. The General 
191 j, and the responsibility for respecting the neutrality of Greece, 
Staff may even be broken up. I o n  9 Falkenhayn was Chief of it in 
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DISPUTED POINTS WITH REGARD TO THE GREAT WAR 497 
as for the attack on Verdun, presumably falls upon him, for Hinden- 
burg and Ludendorff at this time were on the Eastern Front operating 
against the Russians on the Dwina. Probably, at that time at  least, 
it was considered politic not to allow the Bulgarian Army to enter 
Greek territory, and German divisions could not be spared with the 
attack on Verdun pending. 
No reference has been made to the Dardanelles Espedition, as 
this question has been threshed bare in official reports and in the 
Press ; but the opinion of General Liman von Sanders, who commanded 
the Turkish troops on the Gailipoli Peninsula (and subsequently in 
Palestine), on General Ian Hamilton’s operations, and especially with 
regard to the abortive landing at Suvla Bay, is comparatively fresh 
criticizm of strategical interest as coming from the other side. 
SUVLA BAY. 
Doubtless, the advantage that ought, or ought not, to have been 
anticipated from the landing at Suvla Bay is a disputed point with 
the friends of Generals Stopford and Hammersley ; and possibly others, 
mho.know the facts, may not agree with Sir  Ian Hamilton’s censure 
of the manner-too deliberate for the occasion, whatever the difficulties 
-in which those officers appreciated and carried out their orders. 
There is also the point, much commented on at  the time in the Press, 
as to ,what Sir Ian Hamilton ought to have done himself when, on the 
evening of this eventful day, he found everything at  a standstill. 
He  was the Commander-in-Chief, certainly, and surprise was the very 
essence of the nianceuvre, demanding rapid and determined action. 
But for the very reason that he was the Generalissimo, he could 
hardly take actual command of a division himself, and with all the 
orders issued for the following morning, and the men tired and in 
bivouac for the night, the situation was such that even the renown 
and authority of a IVellington might have failea to vitalize it. 
The fault, if any, lay in not appointing a young and energetic 
commander for an  enterprise so supremely important. Possibly Sir  
Ian Hamilton is sorry now, in view of the Liman von Sanders admis- 
sions, that he did not for once throw precedent to the winds and 
assume for that evening the executive command of the troops himself. 
As reported in The Tinres of November zoth, 1918, General Liman 
von Sanders stated, in an interview with Mr. G. Ward Price. at 
Constantinople, that for the first twenty-four hours the only opposition 
to an advance the Suvla Bay force \xould have experienced was that 
forthcoming from two battalions of Turkish gendarmes, two squadrons, 
and two batteries of old guns. 
Although, after that period, a division was hurried up from Bulair, 
he is of opinion that, had the British pushed on in several columns, 
they might have entrenched themselves in a position on the heights. 
K U T .  
The unfortunate advance on Baghdad in 1916, with ipadequate 
forces, has been inquired into, reported and debated ad nauseam. 
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49s DISPUTED POINTS IVITH REGARD TO THE GREXT WAR 
But the exact responsibility for permitting General Townshend to 
make this advance in insufficient strength, which was the root cause 
of the subsequent surrender of his forces in Kut, and of the terrible 
sufferings of the sick and wounded on the long line of communica- 
tions during their transit to the base on the Persian Gulf, was never 
settled. 
It was left a disputed point. 
There were a good many people concerned, including the repre- 
sentative of the Indian Army on the Secretary of State’s Council in 
London, the Commander-in-Chief in India, and the Indian Govern- 
ment. But virtually the responsibility was shared by three authori- 
ties: the Home Government, who wanted the advance made, if 
possible, and authorized it ; the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief 
the Mesopotamia Expedition (Sir John Nison) ; and General Town- 
shend. An interesting correspondence on and in connection with this 
p i n t ,  between Generals Nison and Townshend, was published in the 
Blue Book; but, not unnaturally, they failed to agree on the question 
of responsibility. 
On first reaching Kut, General Townshend reported that the 
Turkish troops recently met with were much superior to those previously 
encountered, and, in his opinion, he should be reinforced by an army 
corps before advancing on Baghdad. 
General Townshend did not get the army corps he had said was 
required; but in course of the nest three or four months he got part 
of it and went on. 
After the disaster, General Nison argued that, as General Town- 
shend went on with the reinforcements he received, without making 
any further protest, he had, by so doing, taken the responsibility. 
General Townshend’s reply \\.as to the effect that, having stated 
his requirements to the Commander-in-Chief, it was for the latter to 
take action as he thought proper. As he did not get the full army 
corps or fresh orders, he assumed that the Commander-in-Chief con- 
sidered that the reinforcements sent him ought to be sufficient. In 
these circumstances, as the capture of Baghdad mas generally desired, 
he thought it his duty to make the a d k n c e  without further delay. 
I t  is a nice point, although, doubtless, many will think that 
General Tomnshend was placed in a somewhat invidious position. 
Briefly stated, the facts were as follows :- 
VON I<LUCI;’s CHAXGE OF DIRECTION BEFORE THE BATTLE OF THE 
RIARNE. 
In conclusion, it is now possible to settle this point conclusively: 
why a part of the German First Army-the right wing-which up to 
September had been marching in the direction of Paris, that is to 
say, south-south-west, suddenly marched east-south-east, across tllr: 
northern front of the Paris entrenched camp, from the Oise to the 
JIarne. 
Nine 
people out of ten, or even a larger proportion, still believe that VOII 
Klucli vas marching on Paris with a view to attack it, and that for 
In the popular mind this is hardly a matter of dispute. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
ali
fo
rn
ia,
 Sa
n D
ieg
o]
 at
 20
:43
 25
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
DISPUTED POINTS WITH REGARD TO TIIE GRE4T WAR 499 
some reason he changed his mind suddenly and, instead of attacking 
it, was attacked himself as he offered a flank in following on the tracks 
of the British Army. 
hlilitary critics, however, who knew the old von Aloltke’s plan 
for another invasion of France, and who remembered the Napoleonic 
principle that the first objective of a campaign should be the destruc- 
tion of the enemy’s army, doubted very much if the investment of 
Paris, or even an  attack on this fortress, ever entered into the plan 
of the Great General Staff previous to the decisive defeat of the 
opposing armies. 
Paris, i t  must not be forgotten, is a fortress, besides being the 
capital of France. 
That the original plan of the German Staff for the first phase of 
the campaign did not include an attack on Paris is clear from the 
fact that in the maps issued to von Kluck’s Army of Belgium and 
the north of France, Paris and Meaux did not appear in the area of 
operations, although the country east of Paris watered by the rivers 
AIarne, Aube, and Seine did so appear. 
This fact was established by hI. Joseph Reinach, the Military 
Critic of the Figaro and former deputy, in an article that appeared 
in the Revue de Paris for April, 1917, the maps in question (preserved 
in the French War Office) being reproduced on a smaller scale.’ 
Field-Marshal von AIoltlie, the victor of 1866 and 1870, whose 
great nephew, Genera1 von JIoltke, was Chief of the Great General 
Staff in 1914, had laid it down as a fundamental principle, in case of 
another war with France, that the French Armies must be decisively 
beaten and pursued, if necessary, even to the Loire, before attempting 
the siege, or investment, of Paris. 
There is every reason to suppose, therefore-especially with the 
corroborative evidence of the maps-that the German plan in 1914 was 
in accordance with the Napoleonic rule, and that a serious attack on 
Paris was not contemplated till after the Allied Armies had been 
decisively defeated. 
But certain conversational statements of General von Kluck, if 
correct as quoted by A I .  Hanotaux, put a somewhat different complexion 
on the German advance after Charleroi. It would seem that the 
Great General Staff never expected to meet the French in force in 
Belgium, and that the victories of Charleroi and the Ardennes may 
haye appeared to them at first as more decisive than they really were. 
Of von Kluck’s own view, if his conversation is correctly reported, 
there can be no doubt whatever. After hions and Le Cateau, where 
lie was only resisted by two army corps, whereas he had five, following 
on the victories, exaggerated no doubt in his own mind by his own 
success, of Charleroi and the Ardennes, he considered that the enemy 
had been decisively defeated and that an attack on Paris was already 
feasible. Pursuit of the routed enemy was, and remained, his one 
idea up to the time he was attacked himself in flank on September 5th. 
1 This article formed the basis of a paper contributed to the “ United Service 
Magazine ” in May or June, 1917, by the present writer, entitled “ Von Kluck’s 
Objective after hlons.” 
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$00 DISPUTED POISTS WITLI REGARD TO THE GREAT WAR 
When, after the Battle of Guise (August 30th) and the French 
resistance on the hleuse, the Great General Staff became convinced 
that another great battle would have to be fought, they found it 
extremely difficult-indeed impossible-to restrain von Kluck. 
According to 31. Hanotaux, who follows the German writer Stege- 
mann, it was the intention of the Great General Staff, when on 
September 1st it became clear that another great battle would have 
to be fought, to bring von Kluck’s Army into second line. As both 
sides were pivoting on the Lorraine front, the Germans on the hIoselle 
and the French on Verdun, it was evident that the battle must take 
place to the east of Paris. Without going into the question of the 
German plan of battle, it is sufficient to state here (although the actual 
order is not quoted by 31. H z ~ n t a u s )  that ,von Kluck is said to have 
been directed to bring his Arniy into ses.itl line on the hlarne between 
Chlteau-Thierry and FertC-sous-Jouarre bchind von Bulow (German 
Second Army). 
But von Kluck mas a cavalry general and his experience from 
Mons to Compikgne had led him to believe that his opponents were 
routed and disorganized, and the one great point to keep in mind was 
that a routed enemy should be given no respite from pursuit. 
Either (and most probably) in accordance with the orders of the 
Great General Staff, or simply conforming with the movements of the 
Allies in retreat, von Kluck’s Army changed direction on August 31st 
from, roughly speaking, west to south. Ill-informed opinion imagines 
the whole of von Kluck’s Army from this date as marching on Paris; 
but what it was really marching on was the 3Iarne. Five army corps 
in line over a considerable front and only the two corps on the right 
came anywhere near Paris. These were the corps (IVth Reserve and 
IInd) that made the flank march across the northern front of Paris 
entrenched camp from the Oise to the Narne, caused by the necessity 
of converging on the latter river in accordance with the orders or 
instructions received from the Higher Command. 
According to AI.  Hanotaux, who follows the German military 
writer Stegemann, von Kluck obeyed these orders in concentrating 
his Army on the AIarne between Chdteau-Thierry and La FertC-sous- 
Jouarre, but disobeyed them in crossing at once to the left bank. The 
German Headquarters’ plan required that the First Army should 
remain at first concentrated on the right bank, in order to guard 
against a sortie from the Paris entrenched camp. But, as already 
medioned, General von Kluck’s idea was to push the pursuit of a 
beaten and apparently disorganized enemy, and he considered it 
sufficient to guard against a sortie by leaving his IVth (Reserve) Corps 
and a cavalry division only on the right bank of the blarne. 
He may also have resented the idea of the Second Army (von 
Bulow) being ordered to cross, while his own ever-victorious Army 
was to be relegated to second line. 
T h e  fact that von I<luck was removed from command after the 
battle supports the theory that he wilfully disobeyed his orders in 
allowing four of his corps to cross to the left bank of the Marne- 
having, as we know, to recall them subsequently in succession to 
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DISPUTED POIBTS WITH REGARD TO THE GREAT WAR 501 
support his IVth Reserve Corps, which was attacked on the evening 
of September j t h  by the French Sixth Army (hlaunoury). 
As to his supposed designs on Paris, he may at one time, up to 
September Ist, have had the intention of supporting his cavalry corps 
(von der hlaiwitz) with the IVth Reserve Corps in a raid on Paris. 
But von der AIarwitz was brought to a halt a t  the southern edge of 
the Forest of Compihgne on September 1st by the combat of NCry 
(glorious to British arms, although outpost dispositions defective); 
and aerial reconnaissance soon made it clear that it would be hopeless 
to expect any results from a raid of cavalry supported only by one 
army corps opposed to the forces assembled in the entrenched camp 
of Paris. 
M. Hanotaus quotes an order, signed by one of von Kluck’s Staff, 
directing the IInd Corps to cross the Alarne betmeen Chhteau-Thierry 
and FertC-saus-Jouarre on September 3rd. 
I t  is, therefore, obvious that von Kluck could have had no serious 
intentions against Paris (with only one army corps and cavalry avail- 
able) on the date on which this order was signed. 
H e  is reported to have said himself in conversation that had he 
remained on the Oise and attempted an attack on Paris, the Army 
of the entrenched camp might have cut him off from the rest of the 
German Armies and from his communications. 
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